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Cryptosporidium Outbreak „Water Treatment Failure…:
North Battleford, Saskatchewan, Spring 2001
Patrick B. Jameson1; Yung-Tse Hung, Ph.D., P.E. DEE, F.ASCE2; Chin Y. Kuo, Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE3; and
Paul A. Bosela, Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE4
Abstract: An outbreak of cryptosporidiosis occurred in the town of North Battleford, Saskatchewan, Canada in the spring of 2001. The
outbreak left thousands of people sick including about 50 people hospitalized. The source of the outbreak was from the city’s surface
water treatment plant. The Sedimentation Contact Unit did not satisfactorily remove suspended solids from the source water, resulting in
ﬁlter breakthrough. Contaminated water was released into the distribution system causing the outbreak. Communication breakdown and
confusion exacerbated the situation, extending the duration of the outbreak. The outbreak prompted the province to change the way it
regulated municipal utilities of water and wastewater.

CE Database subject headings: Water treatment plants; Environmental issues; Case reports; Pathogens; Canada.

Introduction
This paper is a summary of an environmental failure case study
that took place in Northwest Saskatchewan, Canada where a
Cryptosporidium outbreak occurred in the spring of 2001. Many
(5,800–7,100) people became ill due to the event (Stirling et al.
2001a, b). An inquiry (Laing 2002) was formed immediately after
this event to “report on, and make ﬁndings and recommendations
regarding the circumstances that led to contamination, adequacy
and effectiveness of actions taken by ofﬁcials, effects of regula
tions, bylaws, policies, guidelines, and procedures on this occur
rence, and other matters relevant to assure safe drinking water in
the future.” The outbreak itself had some possible causes: inad
equate facility planning, antiquated technology, ineffective man
agement, and communication. These causes have been examined
in detail, but it is important to note that the outbreak was entirely
preventable. It is also important to understand that a combination
of causes was required for this outbreak to occur.

Description of North Battleford
The City of North Battleford is located in Northwest
Saskatchewan on the North Saskatchewan River. It is a small
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town with a population of 15,000. North Battleford is located
north of the river while Battleford lies on the south side. The two
towns have separate treatment systems for wastewater and water.
The local economy is based mostly upon agriculture and has suf
fered with declining meat prices. The population is relatively
static but the demographic is changing. The numbers of children
and retired people are increasing while working age people are
leaving (http://www.cityofnb.ca 2006). Likewise, the depressed
economy has resulted in less local government revenue. Life on
the high plains can be very tough due to extremes in weather and
this takes a toll on a city’s infrastructure. Maintenance of an aging
city is always difﬁcult, but it is even more difﬁcult without a
robust tax base.
The North Saskatchewan River is very important in this case
study and deserves more detail. Its headwaters are in the Rocky
Mountains of Alberta. The river ﬂows east through the city of
Edmonton and through the prairie into Saskatchewan. The Battle
ford’s area is not far from the provincial border. Flow rates range
from a low point in the winter of 100 m3 / s to 800 m3 / s for peak
ﬂows in late spring/summer when the river is swollen by snowmelt. Agriculture such as cattle farming occurs in the watershed,
which has a signiﬁcant impact on water quality (Laing 2002).

Cryptosporidiosis
The City of North Battleford experienced an outbreak of
cryptosporidiosis during the spring of 2001. Cryptosporidiosis is
caused by the protozoan parasite Cryptosporidium parvum and
inﬂicts its host with symptoms of diarrhea, abdominal cramps,
vomiting, and headaches. There is no known cure or treatment for
this infection. Healthy or immunocompetent people will ﬁght
off the parasite in 10– 14 days (Finch and Belosevic 2001;
O’Donoghue 1995). However, cryptosporidiosis can be a chronic
condition and sometimes deadly for people with weakened im
mune systems. The real danger to the host lies in dehydration that
occurs with diarrhea. The most well known outbreak of
cryptosporidiosis occurred in Milwaukee in 1993. In this catas

trophe, about 400,000 people became ill and 100 people died
(Peterson 2004).
Cryptosporidium parvum is a gastrointestinal parasite and is
spread through fecal material (Finch and Belosevic 2001; Hsu
et al. 2001; O’Donoghue 1995). The parasite is transported by a
robust environmental vehicle called an oocyst. The oocyst leaves
the parent host with fecal material. Next, the oocyst is ingested
by mouth and enters the digestive system of the new host. This
typically is done through poor sanitation such as dirty hands and
contaminated food and water. The oocyst breaks down in the
digestive system of the new host and settles in the small intestine
where growth, reproduction, and oocyst formation occur
(O’Donoghue 1995). The time between infection and oocyst
excretion can range from 2 to 14 days (O’Donoghue 1995). At
this point, the host displays symptoms of cryptosporidiosis.
The oocyst stage of cryptosporidium’s lifecycle presents a
challenge to water treatment (Hsu et al. 2001; Medema et al.
1998; Peeters et al. 1989; Searcy et al. 2005). Similar to Giardia
spp., this cyst is quite resistant to conventional water treatment.
The oocyst consists of a matrix of glycoproteins and sugar mol
ecules that are strongly resistant to conventional disinfectants
such as chlorine (O’Donoghue 1995; Searcy et al. 2005). While
disinfection with chlorine is very effective against bacteria, it is
relatively ineffective for inactivating Cryptosporidium. Another
characteristic and problem with the oocyst is its size. Oocysts are
very small and average 5 fm but have been known to pass
through ﬁlters of 1 fm (Finch and Belosevic 2001; Medema et al.
1998). However, oocysts are known to be attracted to particles
and are removed by ﬂocculation/sedimentation in conventional
water treatment (Fewtrell et al. 2001; Searcy et al. 2005).
Cryptosporidium parvum affects many animals including ﬁsh,
reptiles, birds, and mammals. There are two genotypes that infect
humans. They are referred to as genotypes 1 and 2. Genotype 1 is
human speciﬁc and can only be spread by humans to other hu
mans. The most common example is drinking water contaminated
with sewage. Genotype 2 is carried by and primarily effects mam
mals, but this genotype can infect people. It is associated with
agricultural runoff, cattle, and sheep in particular (O’Donoghue
1995). In the cryptosporidiosis outbreak of North Battleford, 12
samples from ill people were tested for genotype. Eleven samples
were conﬁrmed to be the human-derived genotype 1 and the
twelfth sample was unknown. These results helped in determining
the contamination source of the outbreak (Laing 2002).

Description of Facilities
Water and wastewater treatment facilities of North Battleford in
clude a sewage plant and two water treatment plants. The primary
water treatment plant is a groundwater source plant while the
second one, the surface water plant, uses the North Saskatchewan
River as its source. The wastewater treatment plant is 3.5 km
upstream of the intake for the surface water plant. Dye tests from
1992 have shown that the wastewater efﬂuent plume runs close to
the surface water intake (Laing 2002). It is reasonable to assume
that the plume changes with river ﬂow and a portion of this plume
may enter the surface water plant intake.
A description of the wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) can
be summarized from the North Battleford Water Inquiry, Com
missioner Robert D. Laing (Laing 2002). The WWTP is a two
stage activated sludge plant that was built in 1957 and has gone
through several renovations and additions. First, the water passes
through a bar screen to remove large objects followed by a grit

chamber. Next, the water enters one of two primary settling tanks.
Secondary treatment begins when the water is fed to an aero
accelerator followed by a secondary settling tank. Finally, treated
water is passed into a chlorine contact chamber for disinfection
before discharge to the river. The plant has a capacity to treat
5,455 to5,910 L / min while inﬂow rates range from 1,818 to
4,546 L / min. Plant capacity can become exceeded during periods
of heavy precipitation when the storm sewers are overwhelmed.
When this happens, excess sanitary sewage bypasses treatment
and discharges into the river. This is said to occur about twice a
year (Laing 2002).
The primary water treatment plant for North Battleford uses
groundwater as its source. The groundwater plant was built in the
1940s and runs continuously. Wells provide the source water that
is ﬁltered, treated to remove iron and manganese, and ﬁnally,
disinfected. The groundwater plant provides 55 to 75% of the
city’s drinking water, but this continually varies. The years prior
to the outbreak had seen a decline in the amount of water coming
from groundwater. When demand surpasses the groundwater plant
capacity, the surface water treatment plant is run to supplement
this need. The surface water plant does not run continuously and
runs 8 – 16 hours a day when in use (Laing 2002).
The surface water treatment plant was built in 1950 and has
undergone numerous additions and renovations. A schematic dia
gram of the surface water treatment plant can be seen in Fig. 1.
The raw water source is the river, which is pumped through sand
separators on its way to the solid contacts unit (SCU) or sedimen
tation tank. Between the sand separators and the SCU, coagulants
are added to initiate the process of coagulation, ﬂocculation, and
sedimentation. These chemicals consist of aluminum sulfate
(Alum), polyaluminum chloride (Aluminex 3), potassium per
manganate, and chlorine. Potassium permanganate is used to oxi
dize organic material. Gaseous chlorine is added at this point to
prevent growth in the SCU and to increase chlorine contact time.
Lime and polymer are added directly to the SCU and agitation is
introduced. Polymer is added to assist in ﬂocculation while lime
is added to increase pH. A pH around 7 is preferred to prevent
corrosion of equipment and pipes. The SCU is arguably the most
important section of the plant. The SCU holds nearly 700,000 L
of water and agitation is provided by a turbine mixer with a
variable speed drive. Coagulation, ﬂocculation, and sedimentation
processes are critical for removing suspended solids from raw
water (Fewtrell et al. 2001; Hsu and Yeh 2003; Searcy et al.,
2005). Settling rates for North Battleford’s SCU are typically 10
to 20%. Water proceeds from the SCU to one of two banks of
dual media (sand and anthracite) ﬁlters and then clearwells. Fi
nally, treated water enters the distribution system from the clearwells (Laing 2002).

Government and Agencies Involved
While an engineering failure caused the outbreak, confusion and
communication breakdown resulted in an extended exposure of
the public to Cryptosporidium oocysts. At the local government
level, it has been assessed that personnel instability, insufﬁcient
budget, and a lack of effective communication with the regulatory
branch of Saskatchewan Environment and Resource Management
(SERM) contributed to this incident (Laing 2002).
Two government agencies are critical for public health con
cerning public sanitation: SERM and the Battlefords Public
Health District. SERM was the regulatory agency in charge of
making sure that plants in the province performed according to

Fig. 1. Process diagram of North Battleford’s surface water plant during Cryptosporidium outbreak

regulations. Similar to the town of North Battleford, SERM went
through a restructuring plan to reduce bureaucratic costs in 1993
(Laing 2002). The critical change was that actual or physical in
spections of wastewater and drinking water plants were discon
tinued. At the time of the outbreak, a physical inspection of the
surface water plant had not taken place since 1991. In small mu
nicipalities, such as North Battleford, the burden of monitoring
public works was left to the town. If conditions or an event oc
curred that could harm public safety, it was to the responsibility
of the municipality to notify SERM.
The Battlefords Health District monitors public health and in
vestigates possible illness outbreaks. It was the health district and
associated medical community that discovered a possible out
break of cryptosporidiosis was occurring. This was not an easy
feat considering that cryptosporidiosis is largely under-reported.
Conﬁrmation of the illness requires a stool sample of the infected
person as well as 5 – 7 days to acquire results. In addition, the
medical community is not trained in the pathology of engineering
and public works functions. Nevertheless, vigilant public health
ofﬁcials noticed a health problem and asked questions, which
eventually led to the cause of the outbreak (Laing 2002).

Previous Problems
The outbreak of cryptosporidiosis that occurred in March and
April 2001 was not the ﬁrst time waterborne illness had been
found in North Battleford. Isolated cases of cryptosporidiosis oc
curred in 1994 through 1998 and coliform bacteria were found in
the distribution system in September 2000. The sources of these
cases were never discovered. Cryptosporidium parvum is a difﬁ
cult organism to test for and just because it was not found in tests
does not mean oocysts were not present. The conventional testing
method for cryptosporidiosis is known as the ICR method and
requires very large sample volumes such as 100 L (Hsu et al.
2001). Obviously, source water from a large river with sewage
efﬂuent upstream is a source of concern. Madore et al. (1987)
found average sewage efﬂuent from activated sludge plants con
tain 1,400 to 40,000 oocysts per 100 L.

North Battleford’s coliform contamination event in September
2000 in combination with a bacterial outbreak in Walkerton, On
tario in May 2000 that caused the death of seven people should
have increased concern for public safety (Hrudley et al. 2003;
O’Connor 2002). Coliform bacteria are easier to test for and treat
than Cryptosporidium oocysts. North Battleford’s coliform bacte
ria contamination event began with a positive sample found in a
dead end section of the distribution system where ﬂow was mini
mal. Further investigation found that chlorine residual levels were
below regulatory levels of 0.5 mg/ L and had been, at various
intervals, for years due to residential complaints of stained laun
dry. Chlorine oxidizes manganese (Mn) and iron (Fe), which are
commonly found in groundwater. Oxidized Mn and Fe turn
treated water brown and can stain clothing. After this event,
SERM requested a hydrology study of the distribution system, a
quality assurance response plan, and an evaluation of the surface
water plant. These were not done by the time the outbreak oc
curred (Laing 2002).

Contamination Event
The event responsible for the cryptosporidium outbreak occurred
on March 20, 2001 when the surface water plant was shut down
for planned maintenance. The SCU was completely drained, re
paired, and cleaned. There was a crack in the ﬂoor of the SCU
that needed patching and a complete cleaning of the SCU was
performed. Shutdown procedures usually left residual amounts of
the sludge blanket in the tank for restarting the sedimentation
process (Laing 2002). After the work was completed, the plant
was started up again late in the afternoon. The SCU was ﬁlled up
again, necessary chemicals were added, and ﬁnished water was
discarded or run to waste. The water was run to waste until a
turbidity of 5 NTUs and a free chlorine concentration of 2 mg/ L
was observed. It was assumed that the ﬁlters could effectively
remove suspended solids if ﬁnished water met this speciﬁcation.
This took about 3.5 hours and afterwards water was run to the
two banks of dual media ﬁlters and ultimately to the clearwells.
Data show that at this time turbidity was 2.29 NTU and free

chlorine was 2.15 mg/ L. It is important to note that shut downs in
previous years ran ﬁnished SCU water to waste for 10 hours to
1.5 days (Laing 2002).
Evidence from the North Battleford water inquiry shows while
turbidities were relatively low, sedimentation was not occurring.
Coagulant and polymer levels were increased to no avail. In fact,
ﬁnished water leaving the SCU sometimes had higher turbidities
than the raw water source. Breakthrough of the ﬁlters occurred
relatively quickly and the ﬁlters had to be backwashed. Water
from backwashing and during the ﬁlter ripening stage should have
been run to waste but was not. This represents a major problem
because particulates and contaminants trapped in the ﬁlters were
now being agitated free and released into the clearwells. Rapid
ﬁlter breakthrough reduced the efﬁcacy of sedimentation and ﬁl
tration. Low sedimentation percentage was noted and bentonite
was bought to help form a ﬂoc blanket (Laing 2002).
The surface water plant was run every day until April 25. April
25 was the day a health crisis was realized and a precautionary
drinking water advisory (PDWA) was issued. Water was being fed
to the distribution system even though settling percentages in the
SCU were unacceptable and ﬁnal turbidities in the clearwells
were sometimes above 0.3 NTU. A very important point made
later by investigators is that these ﬁnal turbidities are a combina
tion of water passing through two different banks of ﬁlters. It was
not possible to see if water from ﬁlters 1 and 2 were performing
worse than ﬁlters 3 and 4. However, a study from an engineering
consultant years before showed that the ﬁlter bank consisting of
ﬁlters 1 and 2 did not perform as well as ﬁlters 3 and 4.
Even though the city was having signiﬁcant problems with
their water treatment, SERM and the Battlefords Health District
were not notiﬁed. The outbreak was discovered by health profes
sionals who, like other residents, did not know there was a prob
lem with the drinking water. Many of these health professionals
and their families experienced cryptosporidiosis themselves. The
ﬁrst known case was identiﬁed and reported to the health district
on April 4, 2001, with the second case being reported a day later.
A family doctor discovered unusually high sales of diarrhea medi
cations at a local pharmacy and informed the health district ad
ministrator. At this point, the administrator, who was also a
practicing doctor at the Battlefords Union Hospital, ordered stool
samples for all patients coming in because of diarrhea. On April
24, the administrator, realizing a possible outbreak was present,
asked a public health inspector to ask the Director of Public
Works and Engineering of North Battleford if there were any
problems with water treatment. The director admitted there was a
problem getting an effective ﬂoc blanket in the surface water
plant, but that it was not a safety concern. However, the public
health ofﬁcer for the province concluded, due to recent problems
with North Battleford’s water supply, that a waterborne source
was most likely the problem (Laing 2002). The following day,
April 25, the local SERM ofﬁcial was notiﬁed of the problem.
The local SERM ofﬁcial reviewed the information and advised a
PDWA immediately. A day later, a boil water order was issued
due to the lack of settling in the SCU (Laing 2002).
Health Canada extrapolated known results during their epide
miological investigation and estimated 5,800 to 7,100 people de
veloped cryptosporidiosis. Fortunately, no one died but 50 people
were hospitalized (Stirling et al. 2001a, b). In addition, the out
break affected people not necessarily living in the Battlefords
area. Many people simply traveling through and unlucky enough
to have a drink of water became ill. The outbreak peaked on April
13, 2001 and quickly dropped once the PDWA was issued on
April 25. Spatial regression also showed that residents living to

wards the southeast part of North Battleford’s water distribution
system were two to four times more likely to become ill than
residents living on the northwest side of town (Stirling et al.
2001a, b). The southeast side of North Battleford is where water
from the surface water plant enters the distribution system while
the groundwater plant feeds the northwest section, even though
the water from both plants mixes.

Remediation
The epidemiological investigation showed that the outbreak
ended in May. However, the boil water order (BWO) remained in
place until July 25, 2001. With the surface water plant’s troubled
history, the removal of the BWO was cautiously slow. A physical
plant inspection was executed and a report generated. A procedure
for removing the BWO was not approved until June 19, 2001.
This procedure required the city to show the treatment process
was working safely and required the city to design a plan to
prevent the problem from reoccurring (Laing 2002).
North Battleford hired a consulting engineering ﬁrm to de
sign and implement changes for safe drinking water. At the
time this paper was written, the same consultant was still
employed by the city (http://www.cityofnb.ca/noticeﬁles/2549_
DRINKINGWATERReport2005.pdf 2006). The changes made
are illustrated in Fig. 2. Possibly, the most important engineering
change was adding new valves and pipes so water could be run to
waste. These critical valves were added at the SCU and the ﬁlter
banks. Sampling sites were added after the ﬁlter runs to allow for
manual water collection and continuous monitoring of turbidity
and particulates. Coagulant chemicals were added at the sand
separators for better mixing. UV disinfection units were added
after both ﬁlter banks. UV light has been shown to be more ef
fective than chemicals for inactivating Cryptosporidium oocysts
(Finch and Belosevic 2001). Chlorine disinfection was moved to
the clearwells instead of before the SCU. Chlorination units
would also be installed for the town’s water supply reservoirs
within the distribution system. Chlorine disinfection was in
creased at the sewage plant for the purpose of treating bypass
sewage. Finally, standard operating procedures (SOPs) were
added for the purposes of quality assurance. The new SOPs called
for the surface water plant to shut down or run water to waste
when the following occur:
1. Sewage bypass events;
2. Chlorination malfunction;
3. Malfunction in the SCU; and
4. Finished water with a turbidity greater than 0.3 NTU.
The remediation solution is a long-term plan concerning
the groundwater plant, sewage plant, and the surface water
plant. While all the plants are antiquated, the sewage plant
and surface water plants should be abandoned for new plants.
In 2005, there was only one positive sample for Cryptospori
dium occurring in the raw source water and no oocysts were
found in ﬁnished water (http://www.cityofnb.ca/noticeﬁles/2549_
DRINKINGWATERReport2005.pdf 2006). However, common
sense dictates that a water intake for drinking water should not
occur immediately downstream from sewage efﬂuent. In addition,
raw source water should come from a protected watershed, not
from a large turbid waterway downstream from cities and agricul
tural areas.
A multibarrier approach as presented by Finch and Belosevic
(2001) is especially important for treating raw source water
known for harboring Cryptosporidium. First, the watershed

Fig. 2. Process diagram of North Battleford’s surface water treatment plant postremediation

should be protected from intensive agriculture. Second, microor
ganisms such as Cryptosporidium and Giardia should be treated
like particles, as they are best removed via ﬂocculation and sedi
mentation. Evidence exists that Cryptosporidium oocysts have an
afﬁnity towards particulates and, thus, the sedimentation process
is an effective method to remove them (Medema et al. 1998;
Searcy et al. 2005). Finally, a good disinfection procedure incor
porating both oxidation and UV light is needed. Chlorine is
needed to kill bacteria and UV light is needed to inactivate oo
cysts. A point that SERM makes is that the multibarrier approach
and ﬁnished water speciﬁcations should be customized for each
plant as each plant design varies, just like raw source water.
The cryptosporidiosis outbreak of North Battleford had a dra
matic effect upon SERM. In 2002, many recommendations of the
North Battleford water inquiry were implemented. These are list
ed in a publication released by SERM (http://www.se.gob.sk.ca/
environment/production/water/Drinking%20Water%20brochure.
pdf 2006). Some of the changes include:
1. Increased funding for the regulatory branch of SERM as well
as more personnel.
2. At least one inspection of drinking water and sewage plants
per year.
3. Plant operators must be certiﬁed.
4. Plant owners must notify SERM when chlorine levels are
low and when equipment breaks down.
5. Watershed planning will be used to protect source water from
contamination.

mon problem, i.e., organizational restructuring and cost cutting,
which went too far (Laing 2002).
In the 1990s, SERM went through restructuring and budget
cuts, which reduced the number of auditors and physical in
spections. A risk assessment model was used to determine
where problems could arise. Effective use of this model favors
larger municipalities and urban areas. Another point made in
the North Battleford water inquiry is that there are many
small communities like North Battleford all across North America
that need closer attention by SERM or appropriate regulatory
agencies. Naturally, this requires greater resources for regulatory
agencies (http://www.se.gob.sk.ca/environment/production/water/
Drinking%20Water%20brochure.pdf 2006).
Technically, the greatest issue appears to be a lack of commu
nication when the SCU was malfunctioning. The local govern
ment, “faced with monetary constraints,” was reluctant to spend
money on improvements for public works unless forced to. The
North Battleford water inquiry recommended a proactive ap
proach for utility remediation using funding from increased water
rates for customers and ﬁnancial assistance from provincial as
well as federal authorities (Laing 2002). The solutions to avoid
such an incident lie in having management that emphasizes sound
technical practices, optimum allocation of resources, and better
communication among all government agencies. Budget con
straints are always a major concern and smaller towns are becom
ing increasingly short of funds, as their economies are generally
shrinking. The access to funds for small towns such as the Battlefords area is critical and requires support from the provincial and
federal governments.

Conclusions
The Cryptosporidium outbreak of North Battleford was prevent
able. Essentially, personnel and government policies manifested
themselves in the engineering failure, which resulted in illness.
The North Battleford water inquiry found both government bod
ies of North Battleford and SERM suffered from the same com
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